Criminal Law Case Notes and Comments:  Abstracts of Recent Cases by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 40 | Issue 6 Article 8
1950
Criminal Law Case Notes and Comments:
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Criminal Law Case Notes and Comments: Abstracts of Recent Cases, 40 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 768 (1949-1950)
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS[
to the above similarities, added elements are present supporting parallel
application. Prior to the McNabb decision, confessions secured under the
circumstances of that case were still open to scrutiny by the trial court
under the voluntary-trustworthy test, giving to the alleged confessor a
safeguard in spite of the methods used by the enforcement officers.52
There is no like safeguard in the conspiracy situation. Once indicted, the
defendant is subject to the gauntlet of risks inherent in the conspiracy
trial without a trial court's inquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds
for indictment. Furthermore, the application of the supervisory power
in the conspiracy field is more likely to attain effective results since the
Court is dealing with a grade of federal officers who would understand
and comprehend its decision.53
Past decisions of the Supreme Court, if not in their direct holding, yet
in their practical interpretation, have generally limited the possible em-
ployment of conspiracy indietments.-4 In as far as the actual grounds
for reversal are concerned, the instant case cannot be said to have a
similar result, but must rather be seen as a prevention of a further
extension of the conspiratorial concept by means of an implied conspiracy
theory. It is suggested however that the concurring opinion is indicative
of a stirring in the Court which could result in the addition of another
decision to the short but important list of cases limiting the use of con-
spiracy indictments in the federal courts.
KENNETH J. BURNS, JR.
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Wiretapping Upheld If One Party to the Conversation Consents-In
United States v. Lewis, 18 L. W. 2323 (D. C. Dist. Ct. 1950), recordings
of a telephone conversation were admitted into evidence as not being in
violation of the Federal Communications Act which would prohibit their
use. It was held that such recordings without the permission of either
party to the conversation would be illegal, but consent of one of the
parties made it proper. The court decided that since there was no pro-
(1929) 206 ("The State's Attorney normally dominates the grand jury, and can
obtain an indictment if he wishes on a very slight showing. In the investigation
before the grand jury, the state's attorney has a free hand . . . the members
depend on him for the law." Id. at 299).
52 See Inbau, Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court (1948) 43
Illinois L. Rev. 442 (the author indicates that from the standpoint of protection of
innocent defendants, the Ma~abb case was unnecessary, since the voluntary-trust
worthy test was available and adequate.).
53 Ibid., where the author indicates the practical view that the average police
officer would not be sensitive to the decision of the Supreme Court. The same
cannot be said regarding United States Attorneys who are officers of the federal
courts.
54 United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926) (conspiracy indictment will not
lie where the substantive offense cannot be committed without joint action.); of.
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) (conviction on a conspiracy charge
reversed due to the Court's interpretation of the controlling statute as not punish-
ing petitioner's participation in the offense, but accord is given the theory of the
Katz decision); Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942) (although con-
spiracy may contemplate several offenses, each offense does not render the agreement
punishable as a separate conspiracy.); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948)
(res adjudicata applied as a limitation on the use of conspiracy indictment in
addition to prosecution on charge of aiding and abetting), see Note 39 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology (1948) 58 for enlightening remarks regarding the case; Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (Held: petitioner has a right not to be
tried for a conglomeration of separate conspiracies.).
[Vol. 40
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hibition against one party to a telephone conversation making recordings
of the conversation, and the rule should be no different just because a
third party actually did the recording but with the consent of a con-
versing party. This decision is contrary to the ruling of the Federal
Communications Commission on the same point, and also to a decision
of another federal court, in United States v. Polakoff, 112 F. (2d) 888
(C. A. 2d 1940). The Commission will authorize one party to the con-
versation to record the talk only if the other party is kept continuously
aware that a recording is being made. From that it follows that third
parties must also inform both sides in the conversation that they are
listening in. This subject is becoming of increasing importance in fed-
eral courts, and may be argued before the Supreme Court before long,
so this case is not the last word on it. (For a discussion of the law on
wiretapping generally, see Vol. 40, page 476 of this Journal.)
Insanity after Sentencing-The United States Supreme Court decided
that a state was not required to give a sentenced person who claims
insanity since receiving his sentence a hearing on this matter, in Solesbee
v. Balkcom, 70 S. Ct. 457 (1950). There the complainant had been sen-
tenced to death by the Georgia courts, but claimed that since that time
he had become insane and so could not be executed. The Governor re-
ceived a report from several psychiatrists sent to examine him that he
was still sane, and so refused to stay his sentence. The Supreme Court
felt there was no question of denial of due process here. The majority
found that the rule in Georgia was, as elsewhere, that an insane man
would not be executed, but this did not mean that the 14th Amendment
required any particular procedure in finding whether the person was
insane. So long as the post-sentence procedure is fair, there is no require-
ment of any particular type of hearing, or a hearing at all. This was
based upon the decision in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949),
where it was held that once the person was convicted in a proper trial, he
could not demand the same sort of procedure for all subsequent occur-
rences, such as the decision of the length of his sentence or whether he
should be put on probation. The dissent in the Solesbee case felt that the
real decision of the majority was that an insane man could be executed.
Res Judicata Effect of a Denial of Habeas Corpus-I n B a r r e t t v.
Hunter, 18 U.S.L. Week 2388 (10th Cir. 1950), the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals applied §2255 of the Criminal Code that when a dis-
trict court passes upon a petition for habeas corpus this decision becomes
res adjudicata as to all later petitions unless new matter is alleged which
the petitioner could not have known at the time of the first petition.
Prior to the enactment of §2252 the federal courts would entertain all
petitions of a federal prisoner no matter how many times before he had
been denied his freedom on the same grounds. The result was that some
federal prisons became regular habeas corpus factories, some prisoners
submitting a fabulous number of petitions until the federal courts were
completely inundated. The purpose of §2255 was to correct this, and still
provide an adequate remedy for prisoners who are improperly detained,
by leaving it within the discretion of the second judge to decide whether
new developments or some other reason made it necessary for him to con-
sider the new petition.
1950)
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Evidence Found During Search Incident to Arrest for a Misdemeanor
Admissible in Larceny Prosecution-In Arthur v. State, 86 N.E. (2d)
698 (Ind. 1949), the defendant was stopped by a police officer for
driving a car without proper identification, bill of sale and license plates.
Incident to this arrest the automobile was searched and the money which
the defendant was alleged to have stolen in the instant case rolled out
of the glove compartment when it was opened. In over-ruling a claim of
unreasonable search and seizure, the Indiana Court held that (1) a
person lawfully arrested for a misdemeanor may be searched without a
warrant and the search may extend to an automobile which he was
operating at the time of the arrest, and (2) that evidence of another
crime, discovered in this manner, may be used at the trial of the de-
fendant for that crime.
The fact that automobiles may be searched without a warrant for evi-
dence of a reasonably suspected crime rests on the sound practical con-
sideration that an automobile is a highly mobile vehicle and may be
removed from the jurisdiction while a search warrant is being obtained.
This is recognized, even under the more stringent Federal rule. (See the
discussion of Brinegar v. U. S., (1949) 40 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 393,
and also, upon the general subject (1947) 38, at p. 239.) IHowever, the
admission of evidence of another crime than that for which the arrest
was made is on more dubious grounds since it tends to encourage mere
fishing expeditions, particularly when extended to misdemeanors which
include all traffic law violations. While upheld in this case, it is a highly
questionable procedure and is not recognized in many cases purporting
to follow the Federal rule.
[Vol. 40770
